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We test the concept of the Opportunistic Approach to monetary policy in South Africa post 2000 
inflation targeting regime. Our findings support the two features of the opportunistic approach. 
First, we find that the models that include an intermediate target that reflects the recent history of 
inflation rather than simple inflation target improve the fit of the models. Second, the data supports 
the  view  that  the  South  African  Reserve  Bank  (SARB)  behaves  with  some  degree  of  non-
responsiveness when  inflation  is  within  the  zone  of  discretion  but  react  aggressively  otherwise. 
Recursive estimates from our preferred model reveal that overall there has been a subdued reaction 
to inflation, output and financial conditions amidst the increased economic uncertainty of the 2007-
2009 financial crisis.  
Keywords:  monetary policy, opportunistic approach, intermediate inflation, financial conditions 
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1.  Introduction 
 
It is now almost two decades that economists approximate central banker’s reaction function using 
mostly the Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993) and its modification by Clarida et al. (2000) and Woodford 
(2003). These models assume a constant proportional reaction of the interest rate to inflation and/or 
output deviations from desired levels. However, a number of academics (e.g. Nobay and Peel, 2003; 
Cukierman and Gerlach, 2004; Bec et al., 2002; Orphanides and Wieland, 2000, and Favero et al., 
1999) have put into question the linear restriction. The view is that monetary policymakers have 
good spirit of discernment and so they are not rigid in their decision making. In fact, economic 
recession  and  economic  expansion  have  different  impact  on  future  economic  performance. 
Likewise, low inflation (below the target), desired inflation (hitting the target) and high inflation 
(above the target) have different impact on the monetary policy stance and to economy.  As such, 
the inflation target band practice suggests that policymakers may exhibit ‘zone-like’ behaviour by 
responding more to inflation when inflation is some way from the target band and passively when 
inflation is inside the target.  
  In  this  paper  we  test  the  opportunistic  approach  to  monetary  policy  developed  by 
Orphanides  and  Wilcox  (2002) and Martin  and  Milas  (2010a)  have  provided  the  first empirical 
evidence of this model using US data. The theoretical foundations provided by Orphanides and 
Wilcox (2002) assume that monetary policy is set depending on a ‘zone of inaction’.
1 Accordingly, 
the literature suggests that when inflation is within the zone, the focus of the central bank is on 
output  rather  than  inflation  stabilization  (see  Orphanides  and  Wilcox  (2002)  and  a  somewhat 
different theoretical model provided by Minford and Srinivasan (2006) for this same concept). In 
their contribution to the topic, Bomfim and Rudebusch (2000) judge that though opportunistic 
strategy may be able to achieve disinflation at a lower cost, it can probably take longer to achieve 
price  stability  than  a  deliberate  approach.  Bomfim  and  Rudebusch  (2000)  consider  that  “the 
opportunistic policymaker takes no deliberate action to reduce inflation further, but waits to exploit recessions and 
favorable supply shocks to lower inflation. When inflation gets pushed down by a shock, the interim inflation target is 
reset to equal the new prevailing lower rate, and, in this fashion, price stability is eventually achieved”. From this 
statement, the two features of the opportunistic approach emerge clearly. 
The first feature is related to the concept of the zone of discretion for which policymakers 
                                                           
1In fact, asymmetries resulting from a framework of target range of inflation can be described as a necessary condition 
for an opportunistic monetary policy but not as a sufficient one.    4
are supposed to behave opportunistically by accommodating shocks that tend to move inflation 
towards the desired level. By contrast, it is argued that policymakers should react when inflation 
tends to move away from the desired level. The interest rate will be raised when inflation is above 
the zone of discretion and decreased if inflation is below the zone.   The second feature is that 
monetary policy should move inflation toward an intermediate inflation resulting from inflation 
target and previous actual inflation rates. This feature of intermediate inflation is based on the idea 
that the central bank should not pursue a target for inflation that is too ambitious in the short run 
but, it should instead pursue a practical target for inflation that is within the grasp of the short term. 
This is particularly relevant for developing countries which might be more concerned about the 
inflation-output trade-off in the short-run. 
  The recent financial crisis has provided an additional challenge to simple Taylor rule models 
adding to the debate on whether Central Banks can improve macroeconomic stability by targeting 
financial asset prices (such as exchange rates, house prices and stock prices). For instance, amongst 
others, De Grauwe (2007) argues that asset prices should figure out as an objective for the central 
bank whereas Federal Reserve governor Mishkin (2008) and Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke 
and Gertler (2001) argue for the converse. We follow previous works by Naraidoo and Raputsoane 
(2010)  and  Naraidoo  and  Kasai  (2010)  who  find  that  the  SARB  has  been  reacting  to  financial 
conditions and that the inclusion of a financial conditions index in the reaction function improves 
the fit of the model. This motivation follows from works by Rudebusch (2002) who raises the issue 
of an omitted variables problem by pointing out that the significance of interest rate persistence in 
the policy rule could be due to omitting a financial spread variable from the estimated regression. 
Gerlach-Kirsten (2004) and English et al. (2003) find that inclusion of a financial spread reduces the 
empirical  importance  of  interest  rate  smoothing  (amongst  others,  Estrella  and  Mishkin  (1997) 
analyze the influence of a term structure variable in policy rules).  
Our contribution in this paper on top of investigating whether the monetary policy reaction 
function for the (SARB) could express the consistency of the opportunistic approach is to augment 
such framework with a more comprehensive financial index variable that pools together relevant 
information provided by a number of financial variables. Furthermore, the main model is estimated 
over expanding windows of data. Recursive estimation provides significant information on how the 
response coefficients to inflation, output gap and financial conditions have varied across times and 
across regimes (within and outside the zone of discretion) with the oncoming of the sub-prime 
crisis.   5
  There are a number of findings worth mentioning. The models that include intermediate 
rather  than  simple  inflation  target  improve  the  fit  of  the  models.  Among  linear  and  nonlinear 
models,  a  quadratic  logistic  function  outperforms  all  other  models  and  provides  support  that 
monetary  policymakers  of  the  SARB  have  behaved  opportunistically  by  accommodating  shocks 
when  inflation  is  within  the  zone  of  discretion  but  reacting  aggressively  otherwise.    The 
outperforming  model  reveals  that  the  zone  of  discretion  is  symmetrically  extending  from  1.81 
percent below and above the intermediate inflation rate. Estimated inflation target range of 3.62 
percent is reasonable for the SARB as the difference between the pre announced lower bound and 
upper bound is 3 percent. Taking the official target range of 3 to 6 percent as a benchmark to our 
estimate, we can suggest that estimated target zone spans from 2.69 to 6.31 percent. We further use 
the  preferred  model  to  evaluate  parameter  evolution  since  January  2006.  Recursive  estimation 
reveals  that  in general,  the  2007-2009  financial  crisis  witnesses an  overall  decreased  reaction  to 
inflation, output and financial conditions amidst uncertainty of the oncoming recession, having gone 
through an extended boom recently. 
The  remainder  of  the  paper  proceeds  as  follows.    Section  2  outlines  the  model  of 
Orphanides and Wilcox (2002) and Aksoy et al. (2006) and motivates the inclusion of financial 
conditions in the framework and we suggest how it might be estimated.  Section 3 talks about the 
data.  Section 4 discusses findings.  Section 5 provides some concluding remarks. 
 
2.  Model specification 
 
We use the model of Orphanides and Wilcox (2002) with the inclusion of financial conditions a la 
Martin and Milas (2010b).
2 As such, unlike the conventional loss function, the loss function in this 
paper reflects a concern with financial stability by including a measure of domestic financial stability 
( ). As in Martin and Milas (2010b), equation (4) assumes that financial stability can be increased by 
reducing nominal interest rates; allowing financial institutions to re-capitalize at a lower cost. 
( ) ) abs( L
2 2 2
y f y
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2 Martin and Milas (2010b) develop a flexible theoretical model to allow for changes in the preferences of policymakers 
when there is a financial crisis.   6
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where  π   is the inflation rate,  
I π   is the intermediate inflation target,   y  is the output gap,   f is 
the financial conditions index,  r  is the real interest rate,  * r  is the equilibrium real interest rate, i is 
the nominal interest rate,   * i  is the equilibrium nominal interest rate, α s are positive parameters,  
s ε   is supply shock,  d ε   is a demand shock and  ft ε  is a financial shock. Equation (1) specifies the 
policymakers’  loss  function  in  terms  of  expected  discounted  sums  of  quadratic  deviations  of 
inflation  from  the  inflation  intermediate  target,  the  loss  from  output  comprises  a  conventional 
quadratic term and also a linear function of the absolute value of the output and the policymakers 
have preferences for  f , the financial conditions index being close to equilibrium reflecting their 
desire to stabilise the financial system
3. Equation (2) is a static expectations-augmented Phillips curve 
while equation (3) is a simple, static aggregate demand relationship. 
Assuming that policy-makers choose the optimal interest rate for period t at the end of 
period t - 1 using information available up to the end of period t - 1, Orphanides and Wilcox (2002) 
proposed the optimal monetary policy rule similar to equation (5) below: 
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The above nonlinear monetary policy rule comprises of three Taylor-like policy rules describing the 
reaction function of the policy-makers and it depends on whether expected inflation is below, within 
or above the zone of discretion. The zone ranges from  δ   percentage points below the intermediate 
inflation target to   δ   percentage points above.   y ρ  and    f ρ are respectively the coefficient of 
output  gap  and  financial  conditions  index.    ZD ρ   and  OZD ρ   are  respectively  the  coefficient  of 
inflation  within  the  zone  of  discretion  and  the  coefficient  of  inflation  outside  the  zone.  If 
                                                           
3 We provide a detailed explanation of how the financial conditions index is constructed in the data section. 
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ZD ρ ≠ OZD ρ , it is an indication that the response by monetary policy makers depends on whether 
inflation is within the zone of discretion or not. By contrast, if  ZD ρ =  OZD ρ  , it is an indication that 
the  monetary  policy  reaction  function  is  linear  and  so  equation  (5)  simplifies  to  the  following 
equation: 
   t t f t t y
I
t t t t f E y E E i i 1 1 1 ) ( − − −
∗ + + − + = ρ ρ π π ρπ            (6) 
Replacing  the  intermediate  inflation target in  equation  (1)  with the  conventional point  inflation 
target   , T π   equation (6) becomes 
   t t f t t y
T
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Allowing for interest rate smoothing as in for e.g. Woodford (2003) we assume: 
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n
in i i i L L L is an indicator of the degree of smoothing of the instrument 
and i ˆis the desired interest rate given by equation (7) above: 
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Combining equation (8) and (9), solving for the expectation operator, E, and allowing for a forward 
looking version we have  
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where  t ε   is  an  error  term  composed  of  expectational  errors.    As  seen  above,  one  of  the 
opportunistic  approach  features  is  the  use  of  intermediate inflation  rather than  simple  inflation 
target. To allow for this feature, we rewrite equation (10) by replacing the inflation target by the 
intermediate inflation target to have   
( ) ( ) { } t r t f q t y
I
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*
1 1 ) (       (11) 
where the intermediate inflation target is defined as 
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It is worth noting that King (1996) has identified equation (12) as a simple inflation learning rule. 
After experiencing high inflation for a long period of time, there may be good reasons for the 
private sector not to believe the disinflation policy fully (see also Bomfim and Rudebusch, 2000). In 
his discussion of endogenous learning, King (1996) says that it might be rational for the private 
sector to suppose that in trying to learn about the future inflation rate many of the relevant factors 
are  exogenous  to  the  path  of  inflation  itself.  In  light  of  this,  King assumes  that  private  sector 
inflation expectations follow a simple rule, that is a linear function of the inflation target and the 
lagged  inflation  rate.  Therefore,  the  intermediate  inflation  target  is  particularly  applicable  for 
countries  which  have  experienced  relatively  high  inflation  rate.  Equation  (11)  allows  us  to 
approximate the intermediate inflation target included in the standard Taylor rule. Note that the 
inflation target will not be identified as it is part of the constant
4.  
To test for the presence of opportunistic behavior, and so the presence of asymmetries, we 
define different regimes and allow for the possibility that the dynamic behavior of the monetary 
authority depends on whether inflation is lying within the target zone or not. As far as opportunistic 
approach is concerned, the model assumes two different regimes; namely the zone of discretion and 
the outside zone. Therefore, at this stage we consider the use of two-regime switching models. That 
is,  the  lower  and  upper  boundaries  of  the  target  zone  are  regarded  as  the  regime-determining 
processes. It is important to notice that the change from one regime to another can be abrupt or 
smooth. If the change is abrupt, then the non linear model will be of the following form    
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4 Martin and Milas (2010a) have noted this feature previously.   9
However, it is more likely to experience a smooth change from one regime to another. In that case, 
a so called Smooth Transition Autoregressive (STAR) model is appropriate:  
 
  ( ) { }
( ) { } δ π π δ
ρ ρ π π ρ ρ ρ
≤ − ≤ −
+ + − + − + =
+ + −




p t p t t
r t t f q t t y
I
p t p t t ZD i t i t
E pr
f E y E E i i L i
1
1 1 1 1 ) 1 ( ) (
  
 
  ( ) { }
( ) { } I
p t p t t
r t t f q t t y
I
p t p t t OZD i t i t
E pr
f E y E E i i L i
+ + −




+ + + − + − + =
π π δ
ρ ρ δ π π ρ ρ ρ
1
1 1 1 1 ) 1 ( ) (
       (14) 
 
  ( ) { }
( ) { } I
p t p t t
r t t f q t t y
I
p t p t t OZD i t i t
E pr
f E y E E i i L i
+ + −




+ + − − + − + =
π π δ
ρ ρ δ π π ρ ρ ρ
1
1 1 1 1 ) 1 ( ) (
  
 
We model the probabilities in (14) using the logistic functions  (see e.g. van Dijk et al., 2002) 
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In  (15  a,  b)  we  follow  Granger  and  Teräsvirta  (1993)  and  Teräsvirta  (1994)  in  making  the 
smoothness  parameter  0 > γ   dimension-free  by  dividing  it  by  the  standard  deviation 
of ( )
I
p t p t t E + + − −π π 1 .  In  equation  (14)  it  is  assumed  that  the  policy  maker  responds  to 
( ) δ π π + − + + −
I
p t p t t E 1  when inflation is below the zone of discretion and to  ( ) δ π π − − + + −
I
p t p t t E 1  
when the inflation is above the zone of discretion. As an alternative to (14), equation (16) assumes 
that the policymaker responds to ( )
I
p t p t t E + + − −π π 1 .  
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where  ( ) { } δ π π δ θ ≤ − ≤ − = + + −
I
p t p t t E pr 1   is the probability that the economy is within the zone of 
discretion. In equation (16) the response to inflation is contingent on whether inflation is within the 
zone of discretion. We model the probability of being within the zone using the quadratic logistic 
function (see, for example, van Dijk et al., 2002) 
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Note that in equation (16), we have entered output and financial conditions linearly in the model. 
However, we have investigated whether there is a different response of interest rates to output and 




3. Data description 
We use South African seasonally adjusted data for the period spanning from January 2000 to 
December 2008. The beginning of the sample corresponds to the implementation of the official 
inflation targeting regime. The nominal interest rate is the repurchase rate (repo rate), inflation is the 
annual change in the consumer price index and output gap is measured as the log difference between 
industrial production
6 and its Hodrick-Prescott (HP, 1997) trend. The financial index is constructed 
as an average of (i) the real effective exchange rate ( ) t REER  where the rand appreciation increases 
the index; (ii) the house price index ( ) t RH  compiled by the ABSA bank, deflated by the consumer 
price index; (iii) the stock price  ( ) t RS  which is measured by the Johannesburg Stock Exchange All 
Share index, deflated by the consumer price index; (iv) the credit spread ( ) t CS  which is the spread 
between the yield on the 10-year government bond and the yield on A rated corporate bonds; and 
                                                           
5 These results are available from the authors upon request. Similar conclusions have been found by Naraidoo and Kasai 
(2010)  and  Naraidoo  and  Raputsoane  (2010)  in  the  context  of  financial  market  conditions  whereby  the  monetary 
authorities place an equal weight on financial market booms and recessions. 
6 We also note that output can be measured using the coincident business cycle indicator computed by the SARB and we 
have provided  robustness checks in Table 3, investigating the effect of this alternative measures of the output gap 
(measured as the deviation of this from a Hodrick-Prescott (1997) trend. In this paper, industrial production seems to 
give a better explanation of the behavior of the SARB.     11
(v) the future interest rate spread which is the change of spread between the 3-month interest rate 
futures contracts ( ) t F  in the previous quarter and the current short-term interest rate.  
The real effective exchange rate, stock price and house price variables are de-trended by a 
HP filter. To tackle the end-point problem in calculating the HP trend (see Mise et al, 2005a, b), we 
applied an autoregressive (AR(n)) model (with n set at 4 to eliminate serial correlation) to the output 
measure and the components of the financial index. The AR model was used to forecast twelve 
additional months that were then added to each of the series before applying the HP filter. The 
constructed financial index is expressed in standardised form, relative to the mean value of 2000 and 
where the vertical scale measures deviations in terms of standard deviations; therefore, a value of 1 
represents a 1-standard deviation difference from the mean. Additionally, all data are seasonally 
adjusted. The index is also in the spirit of the UK financial conditions index provided by the Bank of 
England’s Financial Stability Report (Bank of England, 2007).   
The evolution of the main variables is shown in Figure 1
7. The inflation rate is showing a 
persistent increase towards the end of the sample together with an accompanying increase in interest 
rate. The output gap is showing a severe downturn by the end of 2008. Movements in the financial 
index  have  a  similar  pattern  to  the  interest  rate  which  indicates  a  close  link  between  the  two 
variables, particularly towards the end of the sample. Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1.  
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Tests and parameter estimates  
The specification which fits the data best allows for one lag of the interest rate,  1 = p  for inflation, 
0 = q   for  the  output  gap,  and  0 = r   for  the  financial  index.  The  set  of  instruments  includes  a 
constant, lagged values of inflation, the output gap, the financial index, the 10-year government 
bond and M3 growth. Our empirical models that exclude the financial index variable performed very 
poorly compared to the models reported here in terms of the AIC criterion and the lagged interest 
rate effect turned out to be slightly higher than the one reported here, therefore providing some 
                                                           
7  We  have  done  some  analysis  of  stationarity  and  this  suggests  that  the  inflation  series  follows  a  non-
stationary process. ADF and PP unit root tests do not reject the null with p-values of around 0.13. However, 
in line with common practice, inflation is treated as stationary in our study. (See Fuhrer and Moore 1995, for 
discussion of similar issues).   12
support for an omitted variables problem as outlined in the introduction. Each case reveals strong 
evidence that the SARB has been reacting to financial conditions index since the null hypothesis 
0 : 0 = f H ρ  is rejected at 1% level of significance. Column (i) of Table 2 represents estimates of 
equation  (10),  the  linear  Taylor  rule  model.  We  find  that  06 . 1 , 84 . 0 , 89 . 0 = = = y i ρ ρ ρ π and 
that 10 . 1 = f ρ . This particular model does not comply with the Taylor principle which stipulates 
that the response to inflation is expected to be in greater proportion than the variation of inflation.
8 
The second step is estimation of equation (11) which uses intermediate inflation rather than 
simple inflation target. Intermediate inflation target at period t, is computed as a weighted average 
of inflation target and historical inflation measured as an average of inflation of three previous 
months. We have also tried historical inflation measured as averages of 1-6, 9 and 12 months but 
none of these alternatives could outperform the average of three months. Findings in column (ii) of 
Table 2 show that the substitution of inflation target by intermediate inflation target is supported by 
the data. In terms of AIC the model in column (ii) does better than the model in column (i). 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that µ, the weight on past inflation is estimated at  33 . 0 = µ  and is 
statistically significant . This is evidence that intermediate inflation reveals the behavior of the policy 
makers  of  the  SARB  better  than  simple  inflation  target.  Therefore,  one  of  the  features  of 
opportunistic approach to monetary policy is met.  
The third step is to test the consistency of the feature regarding zone of discretion. In doing 
so, both linear models, equation (10) in column (i) and equation (11) in column (ii), are subjected to 
powerful  tests  of  linearity.  The  λ  test  by  Hamilton  (2001)  and  A λ   and  g  tests  by  Dahl  and 
González-Riviera (2003) reject the null hypothesis of linearity.
9 We then provide estimates of the 
TAR model (equation (13)) in column (iii) of Table 2. We find that  81 . 1 = δ  and that the model 
performs better than the linear models presented in column (i) and (ii).  
The fourth step is aimed at comparing the non linear models, namely equation (13), (14) and 
(16). With the aim to reduce the number of parameters to be estimated in equations (14) and (16) we 
                                                           
8 Similar results of inflation effect being lower than one for the case of South Africa has been noted by Woglom (2003) 
and Naraidoo and Gupta (2010). 
9  We  run  the  tests  using  Gauss  codes  obtained  from  Hamilton’s  web  page  at: 
http://weber.ucsd.edu/~jhamilto/software.htm#other.  To  account  for  the  small  sample,  we  report 
bootstrapped p-values of the three tests based on 1000 re-samples.   13
set  33 . 0 = µ  as suggested by model (11) above and  81 . 1 = δ  as estimated in column (iii). Results of 
model (16) in column (v) exhibits lower standard error and better AIC than any other model we 
have estimated
10. Therefore, we prefer this model for further investigations regarding parameter 
evolution in the next section.   Estimation reveals that the null hypothesis of  0 = ZD ρ  is not rejected 
while  the  null  of  0 = OZD ρ   is  rejected.  Therefore,  the  preferred  model  supports  the  view  that 
monetary  policymakers  of  the  SARB  have  behaved  opportunistically  by  accommodating  shocks 
when  inflation  is  within  the  zone  of  discretion  but  reacting  aggressively  otherwise.  From  the 
outperforming model (16) in column (v) we report that  0 = > ZD y ρ ρ and that 0 = > ZD f ρ ρ . These 
results  indicate  that  the  SARB  turns  its attention  to  output  gap  and  financial  conditions  when 
inflation is reported to be within the zone of discretion.  This outperforming model reveals that the 
zone of discretion is symmetrically extending from 1.81 percent below and above the intermediate 
inflation  rate.  Estimated  zone  of  discretion  of  3.62  percent  is  reasonable  for  the  SARB  as  the 
difference between the announced lower bound and upper bound is 3 percent. Taking the official 
target range of 3 to 6 percent as a benchmark to our estimate, we can suggest that estimated target 
zone spans from 2.69 to 6.31 percent.  
 
4.2 Recursive estimates 
To obtain an idea of how the response parameters OZD ρ ,  y ρ , and  f ρ  evolve over time, Figure 2 
plots the recursive estimates (plus/minus 2*standard errors) over expanding data windows for our 
preferred model; equation (16). The response to inflation is relatively stable up until August 2007. 
From February 2008 onward, the Taylor principle did not hold as the coefficient was slightly less 
than  unity.  A  plausible  explanation  is  that  the  authority  was  faced  with  high  uncertainty  over 
evolving economic conditions with the oncoming recession, having been in a boom recently. The 
response to the output gap was relatively unstable early 2006 but has started declining consistently 
only toward the third quarter of 2007. However, it should be kept in mind that Orphanides (2001) 
                                                           
10 We have conducted a series of robustness checks, investigating the effect of alternative measures of the output gap. 
Our results were robust to these alternative specifications as shown in Table 3. We have estimated models based on 
three alternative measures of output gap for equation (16); namely output gap using industrial production (the one in the 
main text), output gap using the coincident business cycle indicator (measured as the deviation of this from a Hodrick-
Prescott (1997) trend) and output growth. The SARB provides measures of the coincident business cycle indicator and it 
is made publicly available. In this paper, the model with industrial production provides better AIC.      14
and in particular Orphanides and van Norden (2002) have suggested the use of real time data in 
monetary  policy  since  data  used  to  compute  output  gap  are  subject  to  significant  revisions.  A 
possible explanation of our findings is that the magnitude of the response using final data for the 
output gap could suffer from downward bias owing to the errors-in-variables problem. Panel (c) in 
figure 2 reveals a more volatile response to financial index increasing from 0.56 early in 2006 to 1.00 
late in 2007. Since then, the response to financial conditions decreased significantly until it reaches 
0.36 in the third quarter of 2008. This relatively more frequent volatility advocates in favor of the 
concern raised by Bernanke and Gertler (1999) and Filardo (2000) about the potential costs of 
responding to asset price given its volatility relative to their information content. Overall, the 2007-
2009  financial  crisis  witnesses  an  overall  decreased  reaction  to  inflation,  output  and  financial 
conditions amidst uncertainty of the oncoming recession, given that the economy has gone through 
a period of prolonged boom recently. 
 
5. Conclusion 
With the aim to test whether the SARB’s monetary policy makers have behaved opportunistically, 
we have estimated monetary policy reaction function for the period spanning from 2000M1 to 
2008M12. We first test whether monetary policy makers of the SARB have been using intermediate 
inflation target rather than simple inflation target. The equations that include intermediate rather 
than simple inflation target improve the fit of the models. For linear models we use powerful tests 
for linearity and find that the null of linear model is rejected by the data. In addition, we test whether 
policy  makers  have  been  responding  aggressively  to  inflation  when  it  is  outside  the  zone  of 
discretion but accommodating the shock when inflation is within the target zone. We compare 
different linear and non linear models and find that a smooth transition model, supporting the view 
of opportunistic approach, fits the data better. In our preferred model, we find that the zone of 
discretion is symmetric, extending from 1.64 percent below and above the intermediate inflation 
rate. Estimated inflation target range of 3.62 percent is reasonable for the SARB as the difference 
between the announced lower bound and upper bound is 3 percent. Taking the official target range 
of 3 to 6 percent as a benchmark to our estimate, we can suggest that the estimated target zone 
spans from 2.69 to 6.31 percent.    15
With the aim to appraise how monetary policy makers have behaved during the sub-prime 
crisis, we have also assessed parameter evolution of the preferred model by recursive estimation of 
the data window adding one data point at each time. We find that in general the 2007-2009 financial 
crisis witnesses an overall decreased reaction to inflation, output and financial conditions amidst 
uncertainty of the oncoming recession, having gone through a boom recently.    16
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the main variables 
 
t i  
 
t π  
 
t y  
 
t index fin_  
 
( ) t REER  ( ) t RH ( ) t RS   ( ) t CS  
 
( ) t F  
 
 Mean   9.98   5.87   0.32   0.10   0.14   0.09   0.13   1.23  -0.04 
 Median   10.00   5.40   0.26   0.11   0.49   0.47  -0.11   1.21   0.02 
 Maximum   13.50   13.70   4.85   2.82   2.92   2.09   8.88   2.30   30.97 
 Minimum   7.00   0.20  -4.24  -3.26  -4.20  -3.28  -13.31  -1.33  -29.50 
 Std. Dev.   2.14   3.32   1.91   0.90   1.43   1.40   4.65   0.43   8.26 
 Skewness   0.01   0.46   0.20  -0.17  -0.96  -0.69  -0.19  -1.62   0.12 
 Kurtosis   1.61   2.69   3.00   4.45   3.77   2.57   2.90   13.28   5.19 
                   
 Jarque-Bera   8.33   4.12   0.76   9.84   19.33   9.55   0.73   523.58   21.89 
 Probability   0.01   0.12   0.68   0.01   0.00   0.01   0.69   0.00   0.00 
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Table 2: GMM estimates of the Opportunistic Approach on SA data, (2000:M1-2005:M12) 
  (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v) 
i ρ   0.89 (0.01)  0.89 (0.01)  0.87 (0.01)  0.87 (0.01)  0.86 (0.01) 
π ρ   0.84 (0.02)  1.31 (0.22)       
ZD ρ       0.71 (0.28)  -10.89 (3.03)  -0.58 (0.43) 
OZD ρ       1.18 (0.19)  0.67 (0.20)  1.08 (0.06) 
y ρ   1.06 (0.15)  0.85 (0.08)  0.68 (0.12)  0.69 (0.13)  0.58 (0.12) 
f ρ   1.10 (0.11)  1.01 (0.09)  0.81 (0.14)  0.74 (0.09)  0.56 (0.12) 
µ     0.33 (0.08)  0.18 (0.11)  0.33 (0.08)  0.33 (0.08) 













AIC  0.944  0.920  0.936  0.938  0.897 
H0: OZD ZD ρ ρ = (p value)      0.026  0.000  0.000 
J-statistic (p value)  0.998  0.998  0.997  0.998  0.999 
λ test (p value)  0.001  0.01       
A λ  test (p value)  0.000  0.00       
g test (p value)  0.001  0.01       
 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. S.E is the regression standard error. AIC is Akaike Information 
criterion. J-statistic is the p-value of a chi-square test of the model’s over-identifying restrictions (Hansen, 1982).  
The set of instruments includes a constant and 12 lagged values of the regressors included in the model.  The table 
also reports bootstrapped p-values of the λ, λA, and g tests based on 1000 re-samples. 
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Table 3: GMM estimates using alternative measures of output gap  
Coefficients  Nonlinear (quadratic logistic) 
(a)  (b)  (c) 
  0.88 (0.01)  0.86 (0.01)  0.87 (0.01) 
π ρ        
  0.34 (0.38)  -0.58 (0.43)  -0.44 (0.68) 
  1.23 (0.10) 
1.08 (0.06) 
1.21 (016) 
  0.36 (0.08) 
0.58 (0.12) 
0.24 (0.06) 
  0.37 (0.10) 
0.56 (0.12) 
0.52 (0.17) 
  0.40 (0.09)  0.33 (0.08)  0.33 (0.05) 
  2.36 (0.37)  1.81 (0.41)  1.77 (0.37) 
 
AIC  0.902  0.897  0.930 
S.E  0.366  0.365  0.365 
J-Stat (P-value)  0.998  0.999  0.998 
 
Where: 
(a)  Output gap is measured as the log difference between the business indicator and its Hodrick-Prescott 
(HP, 1997) trend; 
(b)  Output gap is measured as the log difference between the industrial production and its Hodrick-
Prescott (HP, 1997) trend;  
(c)  Model using output growth rather than output gap. The output growth is measured as the annual 
growth of industrial production.   23
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